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REVERSING THE EVILS OF FEDERAL MANDATORY 
MINIMUM SENTENCES: IS CLEMENCY THE ONLY 
ANSWER? 
Examining the Clemency and Legislative Policies of the Obama 
and Trump Administrations within the United States 






Thirty-five years ago, Alice Marie Johnson lived a full life.1 She 
was a wife, a mother of five children, and a manager at FedEx.2 
Then divorce, the death of one of her children, and job loss shat-
tered her world.3 Ms. Johnson was able to find employment as a 
factory worker, a role which paid only a fraction of her former sal-
ary and was insufficient to support her children.4 Desperate and 
burdened, she became a telephone mule for drug dealers.5 She was 
instructed to “pass phone messages [and] [w]hen people came to 
town . . .  [to tell] them what number to call for drug transactions.”6   
Alice Marie Johnson’s role as a telephone mule can be likened to 




 * Associate, Andersen. St. John’s University School of Law ‘19. 
 1 See Alice Marie Johnson, Why Kim Kardashian thinks I should be released from 
prison, CNN (June 7, 2018, 8:04 A.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/opinions/obama-
clemency-johnson-opinion/index.html. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See Victoria Law, Mothers Serving Long-Term Drug Sentences Call for Clemency, 
TRUTHOUT (Sept. 11, 2015), https://truthout.org/articles/mothers-serving-long-term-drug-
sentences-call-for-clemency/. 
5 See Johnson, supra note 1. 
6 Law, supra note 4. 
7 See Adam B. Weber, The Courier Conundrum: The High Costs of Prosecuting Low-
Level Drug Couriers and What We Can Do About Them, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1751 
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rings often recruit women as drug couriers.8 These female drug 
couriers are often disconnected from the intricate workings of the 
drug conspiracy and are only expected to transport the drugs.9 
Their minuscule role in the drug ring means they are at a disad-
vantage during the prosecutorial process because they have little 
information to trade in exchange for a lesser charge.10 Such was 
Ms. Johnson’s story.11 She had never been charged with or con-
victed of a crime.12 Nor was she a drug kingpin or ringleader.13 Yet 
she was convicted of “conspiracy to possess with intent to distrib-
ute cocaine, attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute and deliver, money laundering, conspiracy to commit money 
laundering and structuring a monetary transaction” after her co-
defendants testified against her.14 
In the end, Alice Marie Johnson was sentenced to life in prison 
as a first-time nonviolent drug offender under the mandatory min-
imum sentencing laws.15 In Ms. Johnson’s words, she “was given 
a death sentence without sitting on death row” when she was con-
victed on October 31, 1996.16  
Through the Clemency Initiative 2014 (“Clemency Initiative”), 
President Barack Obama sought to use his clemency power to give 
 
(2019) (explaining that both couriers and mules are similar because both “occupy the lowest 
levels of the hierarchy of a drug-trafficking organization.”). 
8 See id. at 1766 (explaining that “[f]rom the perspective of law enforcement officers, for 
example, women may appear less dangerous and thus less suspicious.”).  
9 See id. at 1764-65 (clarifying that “though many drug couriers occupy the lowest levels 
of the drug organization’s hierarchy, not all drug couriers are alike . . . some couriers run 
sophisticated operations to smuggle drugs across borders.”).  
10 See id. at 1753.  
11 See Law, supra note 4 (implying prosecutors did not grant much leniency to Johnson).  
12 See Johnson, supra note 1. 
13 See Law, supra note 4 (Johnson insisted she “never made drug deals or sold drugs”); 
Julieta Chiquillo, ‘I’m that miracle’: Woman pardoned by Trump at Kim Kardashian’s be-
hest visits girls at Dallas County Detention Center, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018, 
10:43 A.M.), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2018/09/27/i-m-that-miracle-woman-par-
doned-by-trump-at-kim-kardashian-s-behest-visits-girls-at-dallas-county-detention-cen-
ter/ (stating that Johnson was considered a low-level drug offender).  
14 Peter Baker, Alice Marie Johnson Is Granted Clemency by Trump After Push by Kim 
Kardashian West, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018, 8:04 AM), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/trump-alice-johnson-sentence-commuted-kim-kar-
dashian-west.html.; Law, supra note 4.  
15 See Johnson, supra note 1; see also Tonyaa Weathersbee, Alice Marie Johnson sur-
vived desperation and injustice. Now she’s helping others do the same, COM. APPEAL (June 
3, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2019/06/03/alice-marie-
johnson-kim-kardashian-west-president-trump-pardon/1330927001/.   
16 See Johnson, supra note 1.  
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convicted nonviolent and low-level drug offenders, who would have 
received substantially lesser sentences under more recent federal 
sentencing laws, a second chance.17 However, Alice Marie Johnson 
did not benefit from Obama’s efforts.18 Instead, Alice Marie John-
son received her second chance when her sentence was commuted 
on June 6, 2018.19 This happened because Kim Kardashian West 
and Jared Kushner petitioned President Donald J. Trump to exer-
cise his clemency power and pardon Ms. Johnson.20 Alice Marie 
Johnson’s story moved an empathetic Kim Kardashian West to ac-
tion.21 In a CNN interview with Van Jones, Kardashian West said, 
“I felt like she’s a good person. You can see that in her.”22  
President Trump’s positive response to Kardashian West’s and 
Kushner’s activism caused some confusion among President 
Trump’s critics and a conflict among his supporters, since the 
 
17 See U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, OFF. PARDON ATT’Y, CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, 
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-initiative (last updated Dec. 11, 2018); see also 
Shaun King, Alice Marie Johnson is Free. Now it’s Time to Free Thousands More Prisoners 
with Unjustly Long Sentences, APPEAL (June 15, 2018), https://theappeal.org/alice-marie-
johnson-is-free-now-its-time-to-free-thousands-of-more-prisoners-with-unjustly-long-sen-
tences/. 
18 See Johnson, supra note 1 (Johnson wrote, “The week before Christmas 2016, Presi-
dent Barack Obama gave a second chance—in the form of clemency—to 231 people, includ-
ing my friend Sharanda Jones. I was not among them.”); see also CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, 
supra note 17. The Obama-era DOJ denied Johnson’s request for clemency consideration 
three times. See Michelle Mark, Trump has granted clemency to Alice Johnson, freeing the 
63-year-old grandmother whose case was championed by Kim Kardashian, BUS. INSIDER 
(June 6, 2018, 12:27 P.M.), https://www.businessinsider.com/alice-johnson-trump-clem-
ency-pardon-kim-kardashian-west-2018-5. Moreover, 7,881 Clemency Initiative applica-
tions were never reviewed, and 8,880 Clemency Initiative applicants never received a re-
sponse. See King, supra note 17. 
19 See Press Release, White House, President Trump Commutes Sentence of Alice Marie 
Johnson (June 6, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
trump-commutes-sentence-alice-marie-johnson/. 
20 See Emily Jane Fox, Keeping Up the Kushners: With Jared Back on Top, Kim Kar-
dashian Heads to the White House, VANITY FAIR (May 30, 2018, 5:00 A.M.), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/05/keeping-up-with-the-kushners-kim-kardashian-
white-house-visit-prison-reform. Jared Kushner, Senior Advisor to the President, is seem-
ingly passionate about prison reform, and, prior to Alice Johnson’s sentence commutation 
and release from prison, he had a number of discussions with Kim Kardashian West re-
garding criminal justice reform. Id. Additionally, “Kushner has made significant progress 
in getting Republican lawmakers on board with the effort, bringing law enforcement offi-
cials and Evangelical leaders to the White House, taking meetings on Capitol Hill, and 
hosting dinner parties with key Washington power players at the home he shares with his 
wife, Ivanka Trump.” Id. 
21 See Darran Simon, Kim Kardashian said she felt ‘connection’ to Alice Johnson and 
wanted to help, CNN (June 7, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/07/us/kim-kar-
dashian-alice-johnson-interview/index.html. 
22 Id. 
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Trump Administration did not continue the Clemency Initiative, 
and then Attorney General Jeff Sessions declared a ‘War on Crime’ 
approach to criminal justice.23 As dialogue heated up over criminal 
justice reform, there was uncertainty as to whether President 
Trump would continue President Obama’s exercise of the clemency 
power to correct the mass incarceration that plagues the federal 
prison system, or whether he would fuel a second wave of the War 
on Drugs.24  
Ultimately, the Trump Administration recognized that neither 
one-off clemency grants nor an ill-equipped clemency program that 
lacked sufficient resources and structure could solve America’s 
mass incarceration problem.25 Rather, the Trump Administration 
understood legislative sentencing reform was the better solution 
to provide lasting relief to first-time, low-level, and nonviolent 
drug offenders serving draconian mandatory minimum sen-
tences.26  
This Note argues the uncertainty inherent in the use of the clem-
ency power with the change of each administration and the bias 
inherent in the exercise of clemency makes clemency an improper 
tool to correct the mass incarceration of first-time, low-level, and 
nonviolent drug offenders.  Part I examines the governmental and 
societal climate that formed the impetus for U.S. mandatory min-
imum sentencing laws.  Part II discusses the impact of U.S. man-
datory minimum sentencing laws on the American criminal justice 
system, namely how it has led to the growth of mass incarceration.  
Part III looks at clemency and how it is used by past and current 
presidents to correct sentencing injustices.  Part IV posits that leg-
islative reform, not presidential clemency, is the most effective tool 





23 See infra Part III.D.; Johnson, supra note 1 (detailing how Alice Johnson referred to 
Kim Kardashian West and Jared Kushner as unlikely voices to be her advocates; see also 
Erin Jensen, Kim Kardashian West talks ‘mission’ of commuting Alice Johnson, Trump’s 
‘compassion’, USA TODAY (June 14, 2018, 9:22 A.M.), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/life/people/2018/06/14/kim-kardashian-west-alice-johnson-today-show-hoda-
kotb/700890002/. 
24 See infra Parts III.C. & III.D. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 See infra Part IV. 
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I. WHERE IT ALL BEGAN—THE WAR ON DRUGS AND 
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING LAWS 
 
On October 2, 1982, approximately twenty-one months after be-
coming President, Ronald Reagan, with the help of his wife, First 
Lady Nancy Reagan, gave an impassioned speech in a radio ad-
dress to the nation.27 In this radio address, the First Lady reported 
the drug epidemic was destroying the lives of children and causing 
consternation in families across the United States.28 In response, 
President Reagan promised a new strategy to address the drug 
crisis.29 President Reagan then followed with a jarring message to 
drug traffickers, “[You] can run but [you] can’t hide.”30  
President Reagan made good on his “tough on drug criminals” 
promise to the American public.31 During his tenure, Americans 
witnessed and experienced the passage of sentencing laws that 
gave rise to the mass incarceration of first-time, low-level, and 
nonviolent drug offenders.32 As a result, the Reagan Administra-
tion gave life to the rhetorical term coined by President Nixon—
 
27 See President Ronald Reagan & First Lady Nancy Reagan, Radio Address to the 
Nation on Federal Drug Policy (Oct. 2, 1982) (transcript available at Ronald Reagan Pres-
idential Library & Museum), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/100282a. 
28 See id. Nancy Reagan informed the public that children were stealing from their par-
ents to support their drug habit, and that alcohol and drug use was one of the primary 
causes of the increased death rate among adolescents and young adults. See id. 
29 See id.  
30 Id. President Reagan also said: “We’re not just going to let them go somewhere else; 
we’re going to be on their tail.” Id. At the time of this address, President Reagan had already 
established a task force in south Florida under Vice President Bush’s leadership. Id. The 
accomplishments of this task force included an increase in the number of judges, prosecu-
tors, law enforcement personnel, and the use of military radar and intelligence to detect 
drug traffickers. Id. President Reagan planned to implement a similar strategy on the fed-
eral level. See id. (stating President Reagan planned to implement the strategy used to 
handle the drug crisis in Florida throughout the United States). 
31 See Sarah Childress, Michelle Alexander: “A System of Racial and Social Control”, 
FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/michelle-alexan-
der-a-system-of-racial-and-social-control (stating that President Reagan fulfilled his prom-
ise to the public of getting tough on criminals by declaring a war on drugs). 
32 See Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (2016) (explaining that the passage of harsh sentencing 
guidelines caused an increase in incarceration rate). “During the 1980s, the Reagan admin-
istration declared a war on drugs. Nancy Reagan introduced her ‘Just Say No’ campaign, 
and the administration launched a law enforcement strategy that resulted in an exponen-
tial increase in federal prisoners and unprecedented racial disparities in the prison popu-
lation.” Id. at 1065. “Between 1980 and 2007, there were more than twenty-five million 
adult drug arrests in the United States.” Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement 
in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 271 (2009). 
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the War on Drugs.33 In fact, “President Reagan turned the rhetor-
ical war into a literal one when he officially announced the War on 
Drugs in 1982.”34 What quickly followed were two important 
pieces of legislation.   
 
A. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986 
 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), one of the “most 
broad reaching reform[s] of federal sentencing,” created the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) and mandatory minimum 
sentence guidelines (“Guidelines”).35 The Commission intended to 
correct disparate sentencing of similarly situated defendants, and 
structure, rather than eliminate, judicial discretion.36 Judges 
could exercise discretion so long as the imposed sentence did not 
overstep the overarching purposes of the SRA and could only de-
part from the Guidelines if there were aggravating or mitigating 
 
33 See Danielle Snyder, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Look at the Disproportionate Effects 
Of Federal Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences On Racial Minorities And How They Have 
Contributed To The Degradation Of The Underprivileged African-American Family, 36 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 78, 90 n.54 (2015) (explaining that when President Nixon used 
the term, it was largely rhetorical because he did not propose any significant changes to 
public policy). 
34 Id.  
35 See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 80 NW. U. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883-84 (1990) (explaining that the 
Sentencing Reform Act contributed to the creation of the Commission); 28 U.S.C.S. § 991(a) 
(LexisNexis 2019) (“There is established as an independent commission in the judicial 
branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission which shall consist of 
seven voting members and one nonvoting member.”); see also David M. Zlotnick, The War 
within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 
SMU L. REV. 211, 216 (2004) (explaining that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 mandated 
the creation of mandatory minimum guidelines, abolished parole and required prisoners to 
serve at least 85% of their sentences). In 1987 the Sentencing Commission released the 
Sentencing Guidelines to be applied prospectively. See id. at 216-17. The Guidelines at-
tributed a base level offense to every offense in the U.S. Code that correlated with a specific 
punishment range; the base level offense was raised or lowered based on additional consid-
erations. See id. at 217. Points were added for prior convictions and the points determined 
the defendant’s criminal history category. See id. The criminal history category determined 
the mandatory sentencing range. See id. Judges were allowed to “depart” from the sentenc-
ing range, but all “departures” were subject to judicial review. Id. at 217-18. 
36 See 28 U.S.C.S. § 991(b)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2019) (stating the purposes of the Com-
mission are to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar 
records and maintain flexibility for individualized sentences); see also Nagel, supra note 35, 
at 883 (stating the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to attack problems of 
dishonesty—where the court-imposed sentences did not reflect actual time served, exces-
sively lenient sentences, and unfettered judicial discretion).  
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factors that had not already been calculated into the Guidelines 
formula.37 In addition, courts were still expected to impose sen-
tences based on the gravity of the offense, with the additional pur-
poses of deterring criminal behavior, protecting the public, and re-
habilitating the accused.38 The result was that departures from 
the Guidelines were unavailable in most cases because the Com-
mission had already accounted for all relevant factors in its for-
mula.39  
Two years after the SRA, Nancy Reagan delivered her famous 
“Just Say No” speech to America.40 She told her adolescent listen-
ers to “just say no” when confronted with the temptation to use 
drugs or drink alcohol.41 During this radio address, President 
Reagan reported the successes of the War on Drugs.42 However, 
he declared there was still much work to be done because the ille-
gal sale and use of crack-cocaine posed a new threat to societal and 
human well-being, and he vowed to implement more stringent 
drug sentencing laws.43  
The American zeal to stamp out crack-cocaine use had begun 
with the recent death of college basketball star, Len Bias.44 Three 
months before the Reagans’ speeches, the media erroneously 
 
37 See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005) (stating departure from Guidelines is 
appropriate where aggravating or mitigating circumstances were not adequately taken into 
consideration by Commission); see also Nagel, supra note 35, at 902 (explaining that “sen-
tencing judges were instructed to review the following: 1) the nature of the offense and 
history of the offender; 2) the kinds of sentences available; 3) the guidelines to be developed 
by the United States Sentencing Commission; and 4) the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparity.”). 
38 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2018). 
39 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 234. 
40 See generally ‘Just Say  No’, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/reagan/stories/speech.archive/just.say.no.html (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2019) (explaining that Nancy Reagan delivered the campaign against drug 
use in 1986). 
41 See id. (stating that the message was aimed at young people). 
42 See id. (noting the administration’s achievements, such as 10,000 convicted drug of-
fenders and $250 million in drug-related assets seized by the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration). 
43 See id. (explaining that illegal cocaine was causing an epidemic that was harming its 
users, and that his administration “still [had] much to do” to prevent its spread); see also 
Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Proposes Stiffer Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1986), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/16/us/reagan-proposes-stiffer-drug-laws.html (explain-
ing implementation of stringent drug sentencing laws by President Reagan, such as capital 
punishment for drug crimes, and drug testing programs). 
44 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Astead W. Herndon, ‘Lock the S.O.B.s Up’: Joe Biden 
and the Era of Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019),  https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/06/25/us/joe-biden-crime-laws.html.  
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reported that Bias had died from a crack-cocaine overdose, when 
he, in fact, died of a cocaine overdose.45 The erroneous media re-
porting amplified public and congressional awareness of crack-co-
caine in the drug market, and the legislative response to this so-
called “national hysteria” was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
(“ADAA”).46  
Congress passed the ADAA without Senate committee hearings, 
without seeking recommendations from the judicial branch, and 
with minimal input from law enforcement agencies.47 The ADAA 
represented a significant departure from the previous sentencing 
guidelines48 as it instituted mandatory minimum sentences based 
on the quantity of the controlled or counterfeit substance.49  
The ADAA also shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors.50 
Prosecutors were given the power to charge crimes that would not 
trigger a mandatory minimum for defendants who provided sub-
stantial assistance in the same or a different investigation.51 It 
follows that low-level drug offenders, like Alice Marie Johnson, 
who could not provide substantial assistance received the short 
end of the stick because they “often had no one to ‘rat out,’ or they 
waited too long to come forward out of ignorance, loyalty, or fear 
 
45 See Spencer A. Stone, Federal Drug Sentencing-What Was Congress Smoking? The 
Uncertain Distinction Between “Cocaine” and “Cocaine Base” in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 311, 313 (2007); see also Lis Wiehl, “Sounding Black” in 
the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 185, 
206-07 (2000). 
46 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207 (1986); 
see also Zlotnick, supra note 35, at 218 (explaining that Len Bias’s death “spiked a growing 
national hysteria over crack cocaine and Congress fell into an anti-drug frenzy [and] [t]he 
result was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986”). 
47 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207; Zlotnick, 
supra note 35, at 218-19; Stone, supra note 45, at 316 (noting that the ADAA was signed 
into law shortly after the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee intro-
duced the Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act, House Bill 5394, on August 12, 1986, 
and President Reagan transmitted his Drug Free America Act to Congress on September 
15, 1986).  
48 See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
49 See Zlotnick, supra note 35, at 219. Consequently, if the Guidelines sentence resulted 
in a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum, then the Guidelines sentence was ad-
justed to match the mandatory minimum sentence. Id.   
50 Id. at 219-20. 
51 Id. at 220 (“Without a ‘substantial assistance’ motion by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 
judges were powerless to sentence below the mandatory minimum even if the judge felt the 
defendant had made a good faith effort to cooperate.”). 
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. . . while higher-ups in the same drug network cooperated in ex-
change for lesser sentences.”52 
 
B. The Fair Sentencing Act  
 
The first sign of meaningful sentencing reform came in 2005.53 
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court dispensed with the 
Guidelines’ mandatory minimum sentences and held that the 
Guidelines were effectively advisory, permitting courts to depart 
from Guidelines’ sentences in consideration of other criteria.54 The 
Court’s primary rationale was that the Guidelines conflicted with 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when judges applied the 
Guidelines’ mandatory minimum based on post-trial evidentiary 
determinations.55 Accordingly, Sixth Amendment challenges to 
the Guidelines’ applications would be moot if the Guidelines were 
advisory rather than mandatory.56 The Court stated its holding 
was necessary to preserve congressional intent for the SRA be-
cause, in conjunction with other points, the statutory goal of the 
Guidelines was to diminish disparate sentencing which may re-
quire judicial inquiry and if Congress had considered the Sixth 
Amendment constitutional requirement it would not have made 
the Guidelines mandatory.57 However, the significance of this 
 
52 Id. Prosecutorial discretion is subject to the worldview of the prosecutor and charging 
decisions on the front-end create a snowball effect in the criminal justice system. See Tele-
phone Interview with Anna-Bo Chung Emmanuel, Former Florida Prosecutor (Oct. 8, 
2019). Therefore, we need “justice-minded” prosecutors who review defendants’ circum-
stances holistically and who are not intent on feeding the prison system. See id. Justice 
must account for everyone affected by the crime including the victim and the accused and 
family and loved ones on both sides. See id.   
53 Robert L. Boone, Booker Defined: Examining the Application of United States v. 
Booker in the Nation’s Most Divergent Circuit Courts, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2007).  
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (detailing that a judge could consider the (i) nature 
and circumstances; (ii) retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and public safety; (iii) avail-
ability of different sentencing schemes; (iv) the sentences and ranges applicable to the of-
fense and the defendant; (v) criminal justice policies; (vi) disparate sentencing among sim-
ilarly situated defendants; and (vii) restitution); U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 266 (2005); 
see also Davis, supra note 32, at 1069. 
55 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 223. Defendants like Booker had “no right to a jury determi-
nation of the facts that the judge deem[ed] relevant” and challenged their mandatory min-
imum sentence on this premise. Id. at 233. 
56 See id. at 222.  
57 Id. at 227. 
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holding did not affect the federal mandatory minimums, only the 
Guidelines.58  
There was more change when President Barack Obama signed 
the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) in 2010 which did affect federal 
mandatory minimums.59 The FSA caused a dramatic shift in the 
charging and sentencing regimes for crack-cocaine offenses by in-
creasing the quantity of crack-cocaine that triggered the manda-
tory minimums.60 The FSA specifically sought to correct the sen-
tencing disparities between crack-cocaine and powder cocaine 
offenses.61 The FSA also repealed the mandatory five-year mini-
mum sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine to come into 
conformity with the misdemeanor penalty for simple possession of 
other controlled substances.62  
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) explained the FSA was only 
applied prospectively to offense conduct that occurred after the 
FSA was signed into law; offense conduct that occurred before the 
FSA was enacted, even if the case was charged after enactment, 
was still subject to previous triggering quantities for crack-
 
58 See Sentencing 101, FAMM, https://famm.org/our-work/sentencing-reform/sentenc-
ing-101/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2020) (explaining that federal mandatory minimums are set 
by Congress mostly apply to drug offenses, whereas, the Guidelines guide judges toward a 
sentence based on the facts that led to a conviction. The Guidelines normally come into 
play when the quantity of drugs is too low to trigger the federal mandatory minimum be-
cause a federal mandatory minimum always trumps a Guidelines sentence). 
59 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010); 
Jesse Lee, President Obama signs the Fair Sentencing Act, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 3, 2010, 
4:58 P.M.), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/08/03/president-obama-signs-
fair-sentencing-act.  
60 See David Bjerk, Mandatory Minimums and the Sentencing of Federal Drug Crimes, 
46 J. LEG. STUD. 93, 94 (2017); Snyder, supra note 33, at 101-02.  
61 See Bjerk, supra note 60, at 94; see also Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Act-
ing Deputy Attorney General, on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to all federal prosecu-
tors (Aug. 5, 2010) (on file with the Department of Justice), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/fair-sentencing-act-memo.pdf. In 
quantitative terms, the FSA reduced the sentencing disparity between crack and powder 
cocaine offenses from 100:1 to 18:1. Id. The triggering quantities for crack-cocaine were 
increased from 5 grams and 50 grams to 28 grams and 280 grams to trigger the respective 
5 and 10-year mandatory minimum sentences. Id. The powder cocaine triggering quantity 
remained unchanged. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 100-02. 
62 Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, supra note 61; see Sarah Hyser, Two Steps 
Forward, One Step Back: How Federal Courts Took the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 503, 509 (2012). Simple possession occurs “when [a de-
fendant] is arrested for having a relatively small quantity of drugs on his person that is 
presumably for personal use and not for distribution.” Id. at 508. “Simple possession of 
other controlled substances by a first-time offender—including powder cocaine—is a mis-
demeanor offense punishable by a maximum of one year in prison.” Id. at 509. 
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cocaine.63 However, the DOJ stated the Commission was not fore-
closed from promulgating Guidelines amendments that retroac-
tively applied the FSA.64 
The application of the FSA to crack-cocaine offenders was far 
from simple and its difficulties implicated two types of defend-
ants.65 Those implicated were (i) defendants whose offense conduct 
occurred before the FSA was enacted but were not yet sentenced— 
“pipeline cases”—and (ii) defendants who were sentenced under 
prior sentencing Guidelines, including those who had appealed 
their cases and were currently serving time in prison—"pre-FSA 
sentences.”66 There was general consensus among courts and the 
DOJ that the FSA did not apply retroactively to the latter category 
of defendants.67 However, the Courts of Appeals were split on the 
issue of whether the FSA should be applied to pipeline cases.68 The 
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits ruled in favor of applying the 
FSA to pipelines cases, and the DOJ supported this holding.69 The 
Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, however, ruled against apply-
ing the FSA to pipeline cases.70  
There was some resolution to the tension over the pipelines 
cases (i.e. category (i) defendants) and pre-FSA sentences (i.e. cat-
egory (ii) defendants) when both the Commission and the Supreme 
Court took action.71 In 2011, the Commission made clear that 
“[o]nly Congress can make a statute retroactive” and effect change 
for pre-FSA sentences.72 The DOJ followed suit and affirmed this 
 
63 See Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, supra note 61.  
64 See id. 
65 See Hyser, supra note 62, at 515. 
66 See id.  
67 See id.; see also Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Attorney General, on the appli-
cation of the statutory mandatory minimum sentencing laws for crack offenses amended 
by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to all federal prosecutors (July 15, 2011) (on file with 
the Department of Justice), https://www.justice.gov/oip/ag_memo_application_statu-
tory_mandatory_sentencing_laws_amended_fair_sentencing_act_2010/download. 
68 See Hyser, supra note 62, at 515-16. 
69 See id. at 516. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 506, 523-24 (describing that the “United Supreme Court resolved the circuit 
split[] [by] finding that defendants sentenced after the FSA’s passage should be subject to 
the new minimums regardless of when their crime occurred.”). 
72 See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Votes Unanimously To Apply Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Amendment To The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Retroactively (June 30, 2011) (available at 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-adviso-
ries/press-releases/20110630_Press_Release.pdf). 
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position.73 In 2012, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in 
a 5-4 decision holding pipeline cases should be sentenced based on 
the FSA mandatory minimums, regardless of when the conduct 
occurred.74 In contrast, the Court did not help pre-FSA sentences, 
and Congress failed to make the FSA retroactive.75 Retroactive ap-
plication of the FSA would have decreased the number of inmates 
incarcerated in federal prison and corrected long-standing sen-
tencing disparities.76  
 
II. PROBLEMS WITH MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 
 
Without question, Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs “transformed 
the landscape of the criminal justice system.”77 The undeniable re-
sult is the mass incarceration of America, where “[l]ow-level and 
marginally culpable drug defendants with no information to trade 
have received very harsh sentences based upon broad definitions 
of conspiracy and weight-based penalty schemes.”78  
Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs has cost the United States an 
estimated $1 trillion since its inception,79 led to the United States 
 
73 See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 67. 
74 See Hyser, supra note 62, at 523. 
75 See Jeremy Haile, Farewell, Fair Cruelty: An Argument for Retroactive Relief in Fed-
eral Sentencing, 47 U. TOL. L. Rev. 635, 640 (2016) (arguing fairness is one of the corner-
stone principles of retroactivity, and that two defendants who are charged with the same 
offense should not be given different punishments merely because they were sentenced on 
different dates). 
76 See id. at 641. Conversely, opponents of retroactivity are concerned the retroactive 
application of sentencing reform imposes an undue burden on the judiciary, unsettles court 
judgments when cases are reopened, and overrides the separation of powers doctrine. See 
id. at 645-47. 
77 Zlotnick, supra note 35, at 211. 
78 Id. at 212; see also Raishad Hardnett, The Prisoners Left Behind, CANNABIS WIRE 
(Sept. 7, 2018, 6:50 A.M.), https://cannabiswire.com/2018/09/07/the-prisoners-left-behind/; 
Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, Doing 
Kimbrough Justice, and A Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873, 
883 (2014). Mass incarceration indiscriminately affects communities of color. See Haile, su-
pra note 75, at 637 (“It is well known that African Americans, in particular, have borne the 
greatest burden of the nation’s four-decade long experiment with mass incarceration. Black 
men are incarcerated at a rate six times greater than white men and black women at a rate 
twice that of white women.”). Mass incarceration disrupts the familial unit and perpetuates 
violent and criminal conduct within African American and Latino communities. See Aimée 
Tecla Canty, Note, A Return to Balance: Federal Sentencing Reform After the “Tough-on-
Crime” Era, 44 STETSON L. REV. 893, 894 (2015). 
79 See Betsy Pearl, Ending the War on Drugs: By the Numbers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/re-
ports/2018/06/27/452819/ending-war-drugs-numbers/.  
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having the highest incarceration rate in the world,80 and helped 
create a federal prison system that houses more inmates than any 
individual state.81 From the 1950s to the mid 1970s, the federal 
and state prison population combined remained constant at 
around 200,000 inmates (plus or minus a few thousand).82 After 
the inception of the War on Drugs, the prison population increased 
steadily until 2010 (with a small decline between 2010 and 
2014).83 On the broad scale, from 1974 to 2014, the total combined 
prison population increased from 218,466 to 1,508,636; from 1980 
to 2014 the number of incarcerated drug offenders increased from 
41,000 to 488,400.84 In 2016, approximately 2.2 million Americans 
were incarcerated.85  
The general consensus is that the War on Drugs is the dominant 
cause of the increase in the prison population.86 The numbers sup-
port the assertion that a plethora of criminal offenders who were 
sentenced under the SRA and ADAA for first-time, low-level, and 
nonviolent offenses, like Alice Marie Johnson, are still in prison.87 
Plus, the Commission has confirmed that “[m]andatory minimum 
penalties continue to significantly impact the size and composition 
of the federal prison population.”88  
The enactment of the FSA and the repeal of other mandatory 
minimum sentences drove a decrease in the federal prison 
 
80 See Tyjen Tsai & Paola Scommegna, U.S. Has World’s Highest Incarceration Rate, 
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.prb.org/us-incarceration/; 
see also Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 811, 816 (2017) (noting America incarcerates more people “than the top 
thirty-five European countries combined, and dwarfs [the incarceration rate of] not only 
other Western allies but also countries like Russia and Iran”). 
81 See JENNIFER BRONSON & ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017 4 (2019). 
82 See Lauren Carroll, How the war on drugs affected incarceration rates, POLITIFACT 
(July  10, 2016, 6:27 P.M.), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/state-
ments/2016/jul/10/cory-booker/how-war-drugs-affected-incarceration-rates/. 
83 Id.  
84 See id. (noting this increase represents a 600 percent and 1,000 percent increase, 
respectively). 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 See Davis, supra note 32, at 1070. 
88 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES: 2017 
OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (REPORT AT A GLANCE) (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/re-
search-and-publications/backgrounders/RG-mm-overview.pdf (reporting that, in 2016, 
“slightly more than half (55.7%; N=92,870) of federal inmates in custody were convicted of 
an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty”). 
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population and contributed to lesser federal drug convictions 
based on mandatory minimums.89 The Commission reported in 
both 2015 and 2017 respectively that (i) “the FSA . . . reduced the 
federal prison population, and appears to have resulted in fewer 
federal prosecutions for crack cocaine,”90 and (ii) “[o]f the 19,584 
drug offenders sentenced in fiscal year 2016, less than one-half 
(46.8%) were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory mini-
mum penalty.”91 However, mandatory minimums are still woven 
into the framework of the criminal justice system.92 The average 
sentence of the federal drug offenders convicted of a mandatory 
minimum in 2016 was 125 months, while the average sentence of 
federal drug offenders not convicted of a mandatory minimum was 
39 months because their offense did not carry a mandatory mini-
mum penalty.93 Consequently, drug offenders sentenced based on 
federal mandatory minimums are serving longer sentences than 
their counterparts who are relieved from mandatory minimums.94 
When Ms. Johnson was released from federal prison in 2018, she 
stated the current sentencing system must be reexamined.95 She 
told Hill T.V., “[t]hese mandatory minimums must be struck down 
. . . [t]here must never be a time that a non-violent first offender 
like myself can receive the harshest sentence next to the death 
penalty. . .life without the possibility of parole.”96 President 
Obama echoed these sentiments in his 2017 Harvard Law Review 
article when he stated, 
 
 
89 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES 
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20170711_Mand-
Min.pdf#page=15.  
90 Id.  
91 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Quick_Facts_Mand_Mins_FY16.pdf.  
92 See id. (explaining that 13.4% of all federal offenders in 2016 were subject to a man-
datory minimum penalty).  
93 See id. (comparing rates at which crack cocaine and marijuana offenders were sub-
jected to mandatory minimum sentences—71.4% and 33.6%, respectively).  
94 See id. 
95 See Julia Manchester, Alice Marie Johnson: Mandatory minimum sentences must be 
struck down, HILL (July 19, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/397849-alice-marie-john-
son-mandatory-minimums-must-be-struck-down.  
96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “No other developed nation sentences nonvi-
olent offenders to life without the possibility of parole. In fact, most nations have even re-
moved such harsh sentences for violent offenders.” King, supra note 17. 
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[e]very dollar that the Department of Justice spends on ex-
cessive sentences for nonviolent drug offenses represents a 
dollar we don’t have for investigating emerging threats, 
from hackers to home-grown terrorists. And it’s a dollar we 
don’t have to support state and local law enforcement with 
more cops on the street and crucial programs for preven-
tion, intervention and reentry.97 
 
 The impact of the mass incarceration of first-time, low-level, and 
nonviolent drug offenders in America has proved to be counterpro-
ductive.98 A 2014 study by Peter Reuter at the University of Mar-
yland and Harold Pollack at the University of Chicago concluded 
that harsh sentences or supply-elimination efforts are no more ef-
fective at decreasing accessibility to narcotics and substance abuse 
than lighter penalties.99 Harsh penalties, such as mandatory min-
imum sentences, may have some effect on curbing the illegal drug 
market, but that effect is negligible.100 Other research revealed 
draconian sentencing laws do not deter crime and tend to increase 
the likelihood of criminal conduct after release.101 In other words, 
“prison can exacerbate, not reduce, recidivism [and] [p]risons 
themselves may be schools for learning to commit crimes.”102 
 
III. THE CLEMENCY POWER AND ITS ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
A. An Introduction to Clemency 
 
The clemency power is a constitutional grant.103 Under Article 
II of the Constitution, the President “shall have power to grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, 
 
97 Obama, supra note 80, at 818 (quoting Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
98 See German Lopez, The new war on drugs, VOX (Sept.  13, 2017, 7:50 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/5/16135848/drug-war-opioid-epidemic (de-
scribing that harsh sentencing policies for nonviolent drug offenders has not worked in the 
past and those same policies are still not working for the current opioid epidemic).  
99 See id. 
100 See id.  
101 See Five Things About Deterrence, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (June 5, 2016), 
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/five-things-about-deterrence.  
102 Id.  
103 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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except in Cases of Impeachment.”104 The clemency grant is rooted 
in the Framers’ beliefs that the “nation’s chief executive should be 
able . . . to ameliorate miscarriages of justice.”105 
The clemency power is exercised in the form of pardons, commu-
tations, remissions, reprieves, or amnesty.106 Clemency is often a 
last resort tool to correct unjust criminal sentences; the Supreme 
Court referred to the clemency power as the “fail safe” in the Amer-
ican criminal justice system.107 The President has broad discretion 
to exercise the clemency power however and whenever he or she 
sees fit,108 and the power is not subject to judicial or congressional 
review.109 Even so, the Framers assumed the President would nei-
ther abuse this power, nor use it frivolously and mindlessly.110 
With that said, how a President uses the clemency power may in-
form the public of his criminal justice policies.111 
Historically, the use of the clemency power has waxed and 
waned with each administration.112 Some presidents, like “George 
Washington and John Adams did not use their power 
 
104 Id. 
105 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., “A Day Late and A Dollar Short”—President Obama’s Clem-
ency Initiative 2014, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 148 (2018) [hereinafter Larkin, A Day 
Late and A Dollar Short]. 
106 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 833, 846 (2016) [hereinafter Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process]. Pardon is 
defined as “a release from the penalty of an offense” or a “forgiveness of a serious offense 
or offender.” Pardon, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/pardon (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2018). Commutation is defined as “the changing of a prison sentence or 
other penalty to another less severe.” Commutation, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dic-
tionary.com/browse/commutation (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). Reprieve is defined as “to 
delay the impending punishment or sentence of (a condemned person).” Reprieve, 
DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/reprieve (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). 
Amnesty is defined as “a general pardon for offenses, especially political offenses, against 
a government, often granted before any trial or conviction” or “an act of forgiveness for 
past offenses, especially to a class of persons as a whole.” Amnesty, DICTIONARY.COM, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/amnesty (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).   
107 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 841 (quoting Her-
rera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993)). 
108 See id. at 847-48. 
109 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Proposal to Restructure the Clemency Process—the Vice 
President as Head of a White House Clemency Office, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 237 
(2017) [hereinafter Larkin, Vice President as Head of a White House Clemency Office]. 
110 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 848. 
111 See Larkin, Vice President as Head of a White House Clemency Office, supra note 
109. 
112 See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. 
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vigorously.”113 Others, such as “Thomas Jefferson, James Madi-
son, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams did.”114 The Presi-
dents that served between 1961 and 1981 issued an average of 150 
pardons annually.115 However, the Reagan-era and beyond 
marked a decline in clemency grants.116 Between 1980 and 2010, 
the number of federal prosecutions and clemency requests in-
creased exponentially, “reflecting lengthier sentences and the 
elimination of parole for federal inmates,” while the number of 
clemency grants declined proportionally to the point where a suc-
cessful clemency application seemed like “luck of draw” rather 
than the outcome of a predictable process.117 Both President 
Ronald Reagan and President Bill Clinton granted one in 100 
clemency petitions.118 President George W. Bush granted one in 
1,000.119  
 
B. Clemency in Focus 
 
The Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General (operating 
out of the Office of the Pardon Attorney (“OPA”)) are responsible 
for facilitating and overseeing the clemency process and making 
 
113 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 853. George Wash-
ington and John Adams granted 16 and 21 pardons/commutations respectively. See List of 
people pardoned or granted clemency by the president of the United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_pardoned_or_granted_clemency_by_the_pres-
ident_of_the_United_States (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
114 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 853. Thomas Jef-
ferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams granted 119, 196, 419, and 
183 pardons/commutations respectively. See List of people pardoned or granted clemency by 
the president of the United States, supra note 113.  
115 See Larkin, Revitalizing the Clemency Process, supra note 106, at 855. 
116 See id. at 854. “The clemency grant rate dropped by almost half from President 
Carter (twenty-two percent) to President Reagan (twelve percent), and by more than half 
again from President Reagan to President George H.W. Bush (five percent).” Id. at 855. The 
average pardons/commutations from the Reagan Administration (1981) through the Bush 
Administration (2009) equaled 285.5 (ranging from a low of 77 pardons/commutations is-
sued by George H.W. Bush to a high of 459 pardons/commutations issued by Bill Clinton). 
See List of people pardoned or granted clemency by the president of the United States, supra 
note 113.  
117 See Dafna Linzer, Pardon Attorney Torpedoes Plea for Presidential Mercy, 
PROPUBLICA (May 13, 2012, 7:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/pardon-attorney-
torpedoes-plea-for-presidential-mercy; see also Obama, supra note 80, at 836. 
118 See Linzer, supra note 117.  
119 See id. 
JOHNSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/21/20  2:30 PM 
402 JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 33:3 
clemency recommendations to the President.120 At the core of the 
clemency process, the Deputy Attorney General is given broad lat-
itude to decide which criteria to use in a clemency investigation 
and makes judgements on the fate of a clemency petition.121  
President George W. Bush’s Pardon Office “was given wide lati-
tude to apply subjective standards, including judgments about the 
‘attitude’ and the marital and financial stability of applicants.”122 
In 2011, ProPublica and the Washington Post reported that under 
the Bush Administration, white petitioners with similar criminal 
records to black petitioners were four times more likely to be 
granted clemency.123 Many of these white petitioners made cam-
paign contributions to lawmakers who would garner congressional 
support for their clemency petitions.124  
The propensity of the Pardon Attorney and the Deputy Attorney 
General towards “subconscious bias” and partiality did not evade 
the Obama Administration.125 Ronald Rodgers was appointed as 
the Pardon Attorney by President Obama in 2008,126 and he also 
favored whites when he made clemency recommendations.127 As a 
matter of fact, Rodgers brought into plain view “the extraordinary, 
secretive powers wielded by the Office of the Pardon Attorney” 
 
120 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-140.110 (2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/jm/jm-9-140000-pardon-attorney#9-140.112 [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL]; see 
also 28 C.F.R. § 0.36 (2019) (explaining that the Pardon Attorney works under the direction 
of the Deputy Attorney General, and receives and reviews all petitions for executive clem-
ency, initiates and directs the necessary investigations, and prepares a report and recom-
mendation for submission to the President). The Pardon Attorney may seek information 
and insight from the prosecuting United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General. 
See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 120, at § 9-140.111 (“The views of the United States At-
torney and Assistant Attorney General are given considerable weight in determining what 
recommendations the Department should make to the President.”).  
121 See 28 C.F.R. § 1.6 (2019) (showing the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral may utilize reports and services of various governmental agencies and advise the Pres-
ident whether to grant or deny a petition).  
122 Dafner Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, Presidential Pardons Heavily Favor Whites, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 3, 2011, 11:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/shades-of-mercy-
presidential-forgiveness-heavily-favors-whites.  
123 See Linzer, supra note 117.  
124 See Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 122. 
125 See Law, supra note 4 (explaining that “white people were four times more likely to 
be pardoned than people of color” under President Obama’s U.S. Pardon Attorney, Ronald 
Rodgers). The term “subconscious bias” was used by Kenneth Lee, “the lawyer who shep-
herded [Clarence] Aaron’s case on behalf of the White House,” when discussing Ronald 
Rodgers’ indiscretions. See Linzer, supra note 117. 
126 See Linzer, supra note 117. 
127 See Law, supra note 125 and accompanying text.  
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when he omitted critical information in recommending the denial 
of the clemency petition of an African American college student 
who was serving three life sentences.128 “Rodgers failed to accu-
rately convey the views of the prosecutor and judge, and did not 
disclose they had advocated for [the student’s] immediate commu-
tation.”129  
Due to his indiscretions, Ronald Rodgers was removed from of-
fice in 2014, and Deborah Leff assumed his role.130 Soon after, the 
Obama Administration launched the Clemency Initiative.131 Per-
haps President Obama’s motivation to launch the Clemency Initi-
ative, even if in part, was to remedy Rodgers’ failures.  Yet, a real 
concern with the clemency process is its vulnerability to inherent 
(or subconscious) biases.132 Thus, it is surprising that President 
Obama chose to administer the Clemency Initiative through the 
OPA, given its deficiencies.133 Mary Price, Vice President of Fam-
ilies Against Mandatory Minimums, stated “[t]he chief impedi-
ment [to clemency] lies in the pardon attorney’s office.”134 Other 
legal scholars have supported moving the OPA out of the DOJ be-
cause the OPA’s functions in granting pardons and commutations 
may create a conflict of interest with federal prosecutors who put 
the same petitioners in prison and function out of the same depart-
ment as the OPA.135  
 
C. President Barack Obama and the Clemency Initiative 2014 
 
President Obama credited himself with reinvigorating the clem-
ency power after he commuted the sentences of 1,696 federal 
 
128 See Linzer, supra note 117; see also Law, supra note 4 (“Clarence Aaron, a Black 
college student [was] serving three life sentences for being present during a drug deal.”). 
129 Linzer, supra note 117. 
130 See Dafna Linzer, Justice finally comes to the pardons office and perhaps to many 
inmates, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/justice-finally-comes-the-pardons-office 
(last updated Apr. 23, 2014, 2:19 PM).  
131 See CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 17.  
132 See Hardnett, supra note 78. 
133 See infra Part III.C. 
134 Linzer, supra note 117. 
135 See Katie Benner, Pardon System Needs Fixing, Advocates Say, but They Cringe at 
Trump’s Approach, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/us/pol-
itics/pardons-justice-department-trump.html.  
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prisoners through his Clemency Initiative.136 According to Presi-
dent Obama, he “used [his] clemency power to a degree unmatched 
in modern history to address unfairness in the federal system”137 
and that he would “be the first President in decades to leave office 
with a federal prison population lower than when [he] took of-
fice.”138 President Obama believes that his Clemency Initiative set 
the stage for government to continue to exercise the clemency 
power to benefit federal prisoners.139 
The Clemency Initiative was an extension of the Obama Admin-
istration’s policy to ameliorate the consequences of harsh manda-
tory minimum sentencing laws.140 Eight months before the launch 
of the Clemency Initiative, President Obama’s Attorney General, 
Eric Holder, instructed prosecutors to refrain from charging de-
fendants for drug quantities that triggered mandatory minimums 
and to refrain from pursuing enhancements for low-level and non-
violent drug offenders who did not have a significant criminal his-
tory.141 Holder stated, “long sentences for low-level, non-violent 
drug offenses do not promote public safety . . . [and] rising prison 
costs have reduced spending on criminal justice initiatives.”142 The 
DOJ stated President Obama would use his clemency power in an 
aggressive and systematic way to correct sentencing injustices.143  
The Clemency Initiative targeted nonviolent and low-level drug 
offenders who would have received substantially lower sentences 
under current sentencing guidelines, including pre-FSA 
 
136 See Obama, supra note 80, at 838; CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL LAW, N.Y. 
UNIV., THE MERCY LOTTERY: A REVIEW OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY 
INITIATIVE 6 (2018), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_docu-
ments/The%20Mercy%20Lottery.Report%20on%20Obama%20Clemency%20Initia-
tive.2018.pdf [hereinafter Mercy Lottery]. 
137 Obama, supra note 80, at 824. 
138 Id.; see also Larkin, Vice President as Head of a White House Clemency Office, supra 
note 109 (“With the exception of President Barack Obama, who granted a large number of 
commutations to drug offenders, over the past few decades chief executives have granted 
clemency far less frequently than in years past.”). 
139 See Obama, supra note 80, at 815. 
140 See id. at 838.   
141 See Memorandum from the Attorney General to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-
mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf.  
142 Id.  
143 See Luke C. Beasley & William D. Ferraro, How the Obama Administration Used 
Retroactivity to Advance Its Sentencing Priorities, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259, 266 
(2018). 
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sentences.144 Specifically, applicants must have met most, if not 
all, of the following eligibility criteria: 
 
(i) They are currently serving a federal sentence in prison and, 
by operation of law, likely would have received a substantially 
lower sentence if convicted of the same offense(s) today; 
(ii) They are non-violent, low-level offenders without significant 
ties to large scale criminal organizations, gangs or cartels; 
(iii) They have served at least 10 years of their prison sentence;  
(iv) They do not have a significant criminal history; 
(v) They have demonstrated good conduct in prison; and  
(vi) They have had no history of violence prior to or during their 
current term of imprisonment.145 
 
Under the Clemency Initiative’s process, petitioners submitted 
a completed eligibility survey for screening.146 Then, if a petitioner 
appeared to meet the eligibility criteria, a pro bono attorney as-
sisted the petitioner in filing an application with the OPA, and the 
OPA reviewed the application and made recommendations to the 
Deputy Attorney General.147 Subsequently, the Deputy Attorney 
General reviewed the OPA’s recommendations and determined if 
the White House Counsel’s Office should review the clemency rec-
ommendation.148  
By and large, President Obama’s Clemency Initiative was un-
successful.149 From the inception of the program in 2014 until 
President Obama left office in 2019, approximately 24,000 federal 
prisoners sought relief through the Clemency Initiative.150 The 
DOJ made recommendations to the White House on 16,776 drug 
offender clemency petitions but the majority of the recommenda-
tions were denials.151 At the end of President Obama’s second 
 
144 See CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 17. 
145 Id.; contra Mercy Lottery, supra note 136, at 27 (concluding only 5.1% of successful 
clemency applicants met all six eligibility criteria).  
146 See Mercy Lottery, supra note 136, at 23. 
147 See id. at 23-24. 
148 See id. at 24. 
149 See id. at 3. 
150 See id. at 3, 6. 
151 See Clemency Initiative, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clem-
ency-initiative, (last updated Dec. 11, 2018); see also Liliana Segura, Obama’s Clemency 
Problem – And Ours, INTERCEPT (Dec. 24, 2016, 9:31  AM), 
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term, 7,881 clemency petitions were yet to be reviewed—including 
3,469 pending petitions from drug offenders—and only 1,715 clem-
ency petitions were granted through the Clemency Initiative.152  
The Commission reported that many applicants seemed to meet 
all of the Clemency Initiative’s eligibility criteria, but only three 
percent of drug offenders were actually granted clemency through 
the program.153 The Center on the Administration of Criminal 
Law at NYU Law School (“NYU Law School”) stated that many 
petitioners “were ideal candidates who were, for reasons unknown, 
passed over by the [Clemency] Initiative.”154 For instance, Alice 
Marie Johnson’s clemency petition was denied twice before the 
launch of the Clemency Initiative and a third time by the Clem-
ency Initiative.155  
The NYU Law School suggested that the Clemency Initiative’s 
poor results were attributable to several factors.156 First, the 
Clemency Initiative was a bureaucratic maze that involved many 
levels of review during the initial screening and application pro-
cess before the OPA reviewed the clemency petition, and an addi-
tional six levels of review before the clemency petition reached 
President Obama.157 Second, the Clemency Initiative’s eligibility 
criteria was vulnerable to subjective review.158 For example, what 
constituted a significant criminal history, history of violence, or a 
low-level drug offense was undefined and left open to interpreta-
tion.159 This subjective analysis might have contributed to the 
lengthy review process.160 Third, the Clemency Initiative was 
overwhelmed by the large number of clemency petitions and 
 
 https://theintercept.com/2016/12/24/obamas-clemency-problem-and-ours/. In 2016, the 
Intercept reported that President Obama rejected approximately 14,000 petitions and 
that number likely increased between 2016 and 2017. See id. 
152 See Clemency Initiative, supra note 152. 
153 See Hardnett, supra note 78. 
154 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136 at 3. 
155 See Law, supra note 4; see also Johnson, supra note 2.  
156 See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136 at 3. 
157 See id. at 24-25. There were up to five internal levels of review, and this was a time-
consuming process because the pro bono attorneys needed to track down hard copy presen-
tence reports for some petitioners or request these reports from the Bureau of Prisons. Id. 
The Clemency Initiative “estimated that it took an attorney an estimate of roughly 30 days 
to complete a full applicant review.” Id. 
158 See id. at 25. 
159 See id. 
160 See generally id. 
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lacked resources.161 Deborah Leff resigned in January 2016 out of 
frustration, because her office was asked to review thousands of 
petitions with inadequate staffing.162 Fourth, clemency in general 
does not mirror judicial transparency and this was a feature of the 
Clemency Initiative.163 None of the actors involved in the Clem-
ency Initiative provided a rationale for clemency denials and peti-
tioners did not have the right to an appeal.164 Rather, “petitioners 
and their attorneys [were] left to guess at reasons for the de-
nial,”165 and “[t]he words ‘random’ and ‘lottery’ that had temporar-
ily disappeared from conversations about clemency began to sur-
face as soon as the grants were announced.”166  
Yet, the problems with the Clemency Initiative stretched beyond 
bureaucracy to issues of inherent (or subconscious bias) and the 
perceived conflict between the DOJ and the OPA.167  
A study by NYU Law School opined that the success of the Clem-
ency Initiative was less likely because it was controlled by the 
DOJ.168 Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates changed many of 
Deborah Leff’s positive clemency recommendations to negative 
and denied Leff access to the White House Counsel’s Office to ex-
plain her recommendations.169 It seems that Yates’ decisions were 
influenced by her worldview where she believed that public safety 
trumped early release of federal inmates and retroactive applica-
tion of amended sentencing laws.170  
In sum, President Obama attempted to use his clemency power 
to achieve mass commutations, but the totality of his efforts left 
 
161 See id. at 24. 
162 See id. Nearly 10,000 petitions. See id.; see also Letter from Deborah Leff, Pardon 
Att’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Jan. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Deborah Leff Resignation Letter]. 
163 See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 22. 
164 See id.; see also Hardnett, supra note 78. 
165 OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 22. 
166 Margaret Love, Clemency is  Not the Answer (Updated),  COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (July 17, 2015), https://ccresource-
center.org/2015/07/17/clemency-is-not-the-answer-updated/. 
167 See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 23-24. 
168 See generally id. at 3. 
169 See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 
YALE L. J. F. 791, 807 (2019). “Leff said, ‘I believe that prior to making the serious and 
complex decisions underlying clemency, it is important for the president to have a full set 
of views.’” Id. See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 136, at 25; 
see also Deborah Leff Resignation Letter, supra note 163. 
170 See Hopwood, supra note 170, at 807-08; see also supra text accompanying note 52. 
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thousands of petitioners in agony and hopeful that another presi-
dent would be merciful.171  
 
D. President Donald J. Trump’s Approach to Clemency 
 
Despite media reporting that President Trump was reviving the 
‘War on Drugs,’ his criminal justice policies and views on clemency 
remained unclear in the early part of his term.172 Though Presi-
dent Trump expressed an interest in criminal justice reform, he 
did not indicate whether he would revive President Obama’s Clem-
ency Initiative or how exactly he would handle pre-FSA sen-
tences.173 Further, the DOJ did not indicate whether clemency 
was a priority for the Trump Administration, or the types of cases 
that would be prioritized for clemency review.174 There was uncer-
tainty among first-time, low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders 
who were waiting in federal prison, including inmates who had 
submitted clemency petitions during the Obama-era.175  
The angst over criminal justice reform at the outset of President 
Trump’s tenure stemmed from Attorney General Jeff Sessions re-
scinding all prior DOJ policies that helped shape the Clemency In-
itiative.176 Sessions’ charge to federal prosecutors to “pursue the 
most serious readily provable offense[s],” ran counter to President 
 
171 See Hardnett, supra note 78. 
172 See generally Sari Horwitz, How Jeff Sessions wants to bring back the war on drugs, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-
jeff-sessions-wants-to-bring-back-the-war-on-drugs/2017/04/08/414ce6be-132b-11e7-ada0-
1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.783beb29119b.  
173 See e.g. Van Jones, Kushner’s effort to sway Trump on prison reform is smart, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/opinions/criminal-justice-reform-trump-sessions-van-
jones-opinion/index.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2018, 6:12 PM); see also Doug Baldwin et 
al., N.F.L. Players to Trump: Here’s Whom You Should Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/trump-pardon-nfl-play-
ers.html?login=email&auth=login-email. 
174 See Hardnett, supra note 78. 
175 See Christopher Ingraham, It’s not just Alice Marie Johnson: Over 2,000 federal 
prisoners are serving life sentences for nonviolent drug crimes, WASH. POST (June 6, 2018, 
4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/06/its-not-just-alice-
marie-johnson-over-2000-federal-prisoners-are-serving-life-sentences-for-nonviolent-drug-
crimes/?utm_term=.4459b505a503. As of 2016, 1,907 federal inmates were serving life sen-
tences for nonviolent drug offenses, and 103 serving sentences of fifty years or more without 
the possibility of parole. See id. 
176 See supra texts accompanying notes 135-38. 
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Obama’s criminal justice policies.177 Besides, Sessions did not pro-
vide any exceptions or additional considerations for first-time, low-
level, and nonviolent drug offenders, except a general acknowl-
edgement that federal prosecutors should exercise good judgment 
when considering a departure from this new policy.178  
Despite the uncertainty and concern, President Trump did exer-
cise his clemency power in a limited number of circumstances, 
granting seven pardons and commuting four prison sentences dur-
ing the first year and a half of his presidency.179 Nevertheless, 
President Trump’s approach to clemency was unconventional and 
described as a solo act.180 President Trump bypassed the OPA and 
the DOJ and pushed White House officials to submit names for 
clemency consideration to him directly.181 A White House source 
commented that the President is “doing it his way and he likes 
seeing how quick the process has been.”182 Others criticized Pres-
ident Trump’s pardons as “scattershot, driven by television seg-
ments, celebrities, friends, and White House advisers who have 
pressed their cases.”183 
However, President Trump’s approach was not an anomaly.184 
Amy Ralston Povah benefited from media outcry when President 
 
177 Memorandum from the Attorney General on the Department Charging and Sen-
tencing Policy (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/down-
load.  
178 See id. In another memo to prosecutors, dated March 20, 2018, Sessions urged pros-
ecutors to consider the death penalty for certain drug-related offenses in light of the opioid 
epidemic. See Memorandum from the Attorney General on Guidance Regarding Use of Cap-
ital Punishment in Drug-Related Prosecutions (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/file/1045036/download. 
179 See Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-trump (last visited Dec. 
29, 2019); see also Commutations Granted By President Donald Trump (2017 - Present), 
U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/pardon/commutations-granted-president-donald-
trump-2017-present (last visited Dec. 29, 2019); see also John Santucci, Trump’s ‘solo act’ 
Push for Presidential Pardons Likely to Grow, WH officials say, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2018, 
9:01  AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/trumps-solo-act-push-presidential-pardons-grow-
wh/story?id=55716257.  
180 See generally Santucci, supra note 180. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See Douglas A. Berman, Prez Trump reportedly “obsessed” with pardons and “may 
sign a dozen or more in the next two months”, SENT’G  L. & POL’Y (June 5, 2018), https://sen-
tencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2018/06/-prez-trump-reportedly-ob-
sessed-with-parsons-and-may-sign-a-dozen-or-more-in-the-next-two-months.html; see also 
Jensen, supra note 2. 
184 See Law, supra note 4. 
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Clinton, in 2000, commuted Povah’s twenty-four-year prison sen-
tence.185 Povah was sentenced for her minimal involvement in her 
husband’s large-scale ecstasy drug operation.186 Arkansas Sena-
tors and community members advocated for Povah, which caught 
the attention of Glamour magazine in 1999,187 and the publicity 
was instrumental in her release from prison a year later.188 Povah, 
who is now the president of CAN-DO Foundation, concedes that 
media publicity is important in the clemency process and she pro-
vides a platform to bring awareness to women seeking clemency 
through the CAN-DO website, and fielding their stories to media 
reporters.189  
Moreover, both President Bush and President Obama relied 
heavily on the DOJ, which proved ineffective at the least, and dis-
astrous at the most.190 So, it is surprising that President Trump 
was not applauded when he chose to sidestep this broken sys-
tem.191 Also, President Trump’s approach is not farfetched consid-
ering former Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden believes 
the “standards [for clemency] should come from the president 
[and] not from the pardon’s office.”192 Furthermore, Gregory Craig, 
who was President Obama’s White House Counsel, believes clem-
ency petitions should be reviewed by “an independent commission 
of former judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and representa-
tives of faith-based groups. The commission would make recom-
mendations directly to the President.”193   
President Trump adopted a modified approach when he solicited 
more names for pardons and commutations.194 White House Coun-
sel Donald McGahn compiled a list of over 3,000 names sourced 
 
185 See id.; see also Amy Ralston Povah, A presidential pardon saved my life. Here’s why 
Obama should pardon hundreds more women, SPLINTER (Sept. 9, 2015, 12:56 PM), 
https://splinternews.com/a-presidential-pardon-saved-my-life-heres-why-obama-sh-
1793850622. 
186 See Law, supra note 4. Povah’s husband was sentenced to only six years because he 
cooperated with authorities and informed them of Povah’s involvement. See id. 
187 See id. 
188 See id.  
189 See id.; see also Povah, supra note 186. 
190 See Linzer, supra note 122; see also supra Part III.A., III.B. 
191 See generally Benner, supra note 135. 
192 See Linzer, supra note 122. 
193 See id. 
194 See sources cited supra notes 190-93. 
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from the CAN-DO Foundation and FAMM;195 Kim Kardashian-
West recommended other nonviolent criminals as possible candi-
dates for clemency;196 and Alveda King, the niece of Martin Luther 
King Jr., submitted the names of 100 inmates to the White 
House.197 President Trump even invited suggestions from NFL 
players in the midst of a protest against criminal and racial injus-
tice and police brutality.198 However, for the latter part of 2018, 
the White House remained mum concerning impending commuta-
tions or pardons.199 Perhaps President Trump had set his sights 
on something greater and more effective—legislative reform.  
 
IV. A BETTER SOLUTION—LEGISLATION 
 
A. The First Step—The First Step Act 
 
In 2015, Margaret Colgate Love, who served as the Pardon At-
torney from 1990 to 1997,  accurately predicted President Obama’s 
commutations through the Clemency Initiative would not make a 
significant dent in the number of inmates incarcerated in federal 
prison because the Clemency Initiative’s objectives were too 
 
195 See Douglas A. Berman, NY Gov closes out 2018 with clemency grants, SENT’G  L. & 
POL’Y (Dec.  31, 2018), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_pol-
icy/2018/12/ny-gov-closes-out-2018-with-clemency-grants.html; see also Steven Nelson, 
MLK niece urges clemency ‘tidal wave’ after giving White House list of names, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/mlk-
niece-urges-clemency-tidal-wave-after-giving-white-house-list-of-names. 
196 See Douglas A. Berman, “Kim Kardashian West pushes White House for more drug 
sentence commutations”, SENT’G  L. & POL’Y (Jun. 14, 2018), http://sentenc-
ing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2018/06/kim-kardashian-west-pushes-white-
house-for-more-drug-sentence-commutations.html. 
197 See Nelson, supra note 196. 
198 See Baldwin, supra note 174. The NFL players commended President Trump for 
commuting Alice Marie Johnson’s sentence, but resisted the notion that a handful of par-
dons could correct systematic racial and criminal injustice. See id. According to the NFL 
players “[t]hese injustices are so widespread as to seem practically written into our nation’s 
DNA. We must challenge these norms, investigate the reasons for their pervasiveness and 
fight with all we have to change them. That is what we, as football players, are trying to do 
with our activism.” See id.; see also Gabriel Sherman, “He Hate, Hate, Hates It”: Sessions 
Fumes as Kushner Gets Pardon Fever, VANITY FAIR (June 13, 2018), https://www.vani-
tyfair.com/news/2018/06/sessions-fumes-as-kushner-pushes-pardons. In June 2018, Vanity 
Fair reported that Jared Kushner was “gearing up for a big pardon push.” See id. 
199 See Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-trump (last visited Jan. 
5, 2019). 
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voluminous to accomplish before Obama left office.200 Love accu-
rately stated, “the problem of unjust sentences is simply too large 
and too pervasive to deal with through the clemency mecha-
nism.”201 Vanita Gupta, the former deputy legal director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, found some merit in the Clemency 
Initiative, but believed executive clemency could not substitute for 
sentencing reform.202 According to Gupta, clemency “[will not] 
bring relief to everyone who should see relief . . . [a]nd it’s not go-
ing to change some of the laws.”203 
The weaknesses of clemency means it will not correct the conse-
quences of federal mandatory minimum sentences.204 Clemency is 
too transient, unpredictable, and prone to inherent (or subcon-
scious) biases.205 Clemency’s transient and unpredictable nature 
flows out of the fact that clemency is a presidential power, and its 
use changes with each administration.206 President Obama’s 
Clemency Initiative was a discretionary policy, not a change in 
law, meaning another administration with a different view regard-
ing criminal justice is not obligated to continue President Obama’s 
criminal justice policies.207 The stark differences in approach be-
tween President Obama’s and President Trump’s use of clemency 
to affect federal prison sentences makes this concept clear.208 Love 
agrees.  She notes, “there are philosophical as well as institutional 
and practical reasons why our justice system is built upon account-
able judicial decision-making under statutory authority, and not 
upon the unstructured and unexplained discretion of a president 
exercising a plenary constitutional power.”209 The truth is that 
 
200 See Love, supra note 167; see also Biography, L. OFF. MARGARET LOVE, http://par-
donlaw.com/biography/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2019). 
201 See Love, supra note 167.  
202 See Kara Brandeisky, Three Things Obama’s New Clemency Initiative Doesn’t Do, 
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:15 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/three-things-
obamas-new-clemency-initiative-doesnt-do. Gupta believed that the Clemency Initiative’s 
criteria was sensible and that the clemency tool had been grossly underutilized. See id. 
203 Id. 
204 See generally id. 
205 See supra Part III; see also Larkin, Jr., supra note 105, at 869. 
206 See supra Part III. 
207 See Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. Approach to 
Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2017). 
208 See supra Part III.C-III.D. 
209 See Love, supra note 167. Love argues that the use of clemency to correct unjust 
sentences minimizes the role of judges and Congress in sentencing reform. See id. 
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federal prisoners should not have to wait in limbo while a presi-
dential administration determines whether and to what extent 
clemency is a priority.  
President Obama admitted the clemency power was not a sub-
stitute for legislative reform.210 He emphasized the “need to pass 
meaningful sentencing reform. No number of commutations will 
ever achieve lasting structural reform of our sentencing laws.”211 
Two pieces of bipartisan legislation, the Smarter Sentencing Act 
of 2013 and Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, were 
proposed during President Obama’s tenure, but did not become 
law.212 Jared Kushner had better success shortly after his appoint-
ment in the Trump Administration.213 Within a year-and-a-half, 
Kushner presented the Former Incarcerated Reenter Society 
Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person Act (“First Step 
Act”) to Congress.214 The First Step Act was passed by the House 
of Representatives in May 2018, but faced opposition in the Senate 
on both sides of the aisle.215  
The initial version of the First Step Act contemplated rehabili-
tation and increased funding for prison rehabilitative programs by 
$250 million over five years and prioritized improving prison con-
ditions and reducing recidivism.216 This version of the First Step 
Act did not address mandatory minimum sentences or retroac-
tively apply the FSA to adjust pre-FSA sentences.217 Some Demo-
crats and Republicans opposed the First Step Act for this very rea-
son—refusing to support a bill that did not include serious 
 
210 See Obama, supra note 80, at 855-56. 
211 Id. 
212 See Smarter Sentencing Act, H.R. 3382, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Sentencing 
Reform and Corrections Act, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015); see also Obama, supra note 80, at 
855-56. The Smarter Sentencing Act and Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act were in-
troduced during President Obama’s second term. See id. 
213 See infra notes 215-16. 
214 See German Lopez,  Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, VOX, 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/22/17377324/first-step-act-prison-reform-
congress (last updated May 22, 2018, 6:18 P.M.). 
215 See First Step Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Congress’s Prison Reform 
Bill, Explained, supra note 215. The First Step Act was introduced to the House of Repre-
sentatives on May 7, 2018, and the bill passed the House on May 22, 2018. See id. 
216 See Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, supra note 215. The goal of the reha-
bilitative programs was to facilitate federal inmates early release. See id. 
217 See supra Part I. 
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sentencing reform.218 The bill was amended in November 2018 
and broadened to include both prison and sentencing reform.219 
The amended bill amassed “the support of pivotal Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress, President Donald Trump’s senior White 
House advisors, and advocacy groups including the Brennan Cen-
ter for Justice at NYU School of Law, and law enforcement 
groups.”220 The First Step Act was signed into law in late Decem-
ber 2018.221 
The sections of the First Step Act that directly impact first-time, 
low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders are: (i) section 402—the 
prospective expansion of the safety valve, which allows courts to 
depart from mandatory minimums when sentencing drug offend-
ers;222 (ii) section 102(b)—prerelease custody in the form of retro-
active application of the new ‘good time credits’ formula;223 and 
 
218 See Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, supra note 215. Democratic Senators 
Cory Booker (NJ), Dick Durbin (IL), and Kamala Harris (CA) vehemently opposed the bill 
and urged other Democratic Senators to vote against it. See id. Republican Senate Judiciary 
Chair Chuck Grassley (R-IA), also opposed the bill because it did not include sentencing 
reform. See id. 
219 See New Compromise on Federal Criminal Justice Reform Should Be Priority for 
Congress, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/new-compromise-federal-criminal-justice-reform-should-be-priority. 
220 See id.; see also Congress’s Prison Reform Bill, Explained, supra note 215.  
221 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
222 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (f) (2020) (A drug offender will qualify for the expanded safety 
valve if:  
(1) (A) defendant does not have “more than four criminal history points, excluding any crim-
inal history points resulting from a 1-point offense . . .; (B) a prior 3-point offense . . .; and 
(C) a prior 2-point violent offense . . .; (2) defendant did not use violence or credible threats 
of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon . . .; (3) the offense did not result 
in death or serious bodily injury . . .; (4) defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, 
or supervisor [in the drug organization] . . .; and (5) . . . defendant has truthfully provided 
to the Government all [relevant] information and evidence . . . .”). 
223 See Congressional Research Service, The First Step Act of 2018: An Overview, CRS, 
(Mar. 4, 2019), at 16. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45558.pdf.  A maximum of 54 days of 
good time credits for each year the sentence was imposed rather than served. Id.; see also 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentence and Prison Impact Estimate Summary, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/prison-and-sentenc-
ing-impact-assessments/January_2019_Impact_Analysis.pdf. “Offenders with a sentence of 
more than one year but other than a term of imprisonment for life may receive credit to-
wards the service of their sentence if they demonstrate ‘exemplary compliance with insti-
tutional disciplinary regulations.;’” Id. Telephone Interview with Priya Raghavan, Counsel, 
Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law (Jan. 30, 2019) (agree-
ing that in the aggregate the change to “good time credits” will positively impact the size of 
the prison population). 
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(iii) section 404—retroactive application of the FSA to pre-FSA 
sentences.224 
Recent studies revealed that within seven months after the First 
Step Act was enacted, the DOJ released 3,100 federal prisoners on 
section 102(b) good time credits and Congress employed the judi-
ciary to administer section 404 retroactive application of the 
FSA.225 In only nine months the courts granted 1,987 FSA sen-
tence reductions.226 Plus, 1,100 federal inmates were released 
from confinement.227 The average FSA sentence reduction was 
from 253 months to 183 months and the reductions were made pri-
marily for African Americans (91.2%) and Hispanics (4.2%).228 Al-
ready, the numbers confirm that legislative criminal justice re-
form promotes expediency, predictability, and stability.229 These 
very characteristics are incongruent with the flaws of using exec-
utive clemency to correct mass incarceration.230   
The provisions of the First Step Act are laudable changes to sen-
tencing laws that will affect thousands of federal inmates: 40,900 
eligible for the prospective safety valve over the next twenty years; 
142,448 eligible for prerelease custody as of May 2018; and 2,660 
 
224 See Congressional Research Service, supra note 224, at 9. 
225 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces the Release of 3,100 In-
mates Under First Step Act, Publishes Risk and Needs Assessment System (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-release-3100-inmates-un-
der-first-step-act-publishes-risk-and. Courts are now charged to exercise judicial discre-
tion to determine if a petitioner should be granted an FSA sentence reduction after the 
petitioner has made a motion. See also supra note 54; see also American Bar Association, 
First Step Act Already Shows Success (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/advo-
cacy/governmental_legislative_work/publications/washingtonletter/au-
gust_2010_WL/first_step_act_article/. Judges have not abused this discretion. Compare 
Part III.C.  
226 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, First Step Act of 2018 Resentencing Provisions 
Retroactivity Data Report, (Oct. 2019), at 5, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/re-
search-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses/first-step-act/20191030-First-Step-Act-
Retro.pdf. Of those granted sentence reductions, 1,894 were sentenced from 1990 to 2000 
and 84 from 2011-2013. See id. Compare Part III.C. 
227 See Sadie Gurman, Justice Department Set to Free 3,000 Prisoners as Criminal-
Justice Overhaul Takes Hold, WALL STREET J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-depart-
ment-set-to-free-3-000-prisoners-as-criminal-justice-overhaul-takes-hold-11563528601 
(July 19, 2019, 04:26 PM).   
228 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 227, at 7, 9. Compare Part III.B, III.C. 
229 See Claire Ashley Saba, A Roadmap for Comprehensive Criminal Justice Reform to 
Employ Ex-Offenders: Beyond Title VII and Ban the Box, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 547, 566 
(2019). 
230 See id. 
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defendants eligible for retroactive application of the FSA as of May 
2018.231  
The irony is that Alice Marie Johnson would still be in federal 
prison even after the passage of the First Step Act.232 Presumably, 
Alice Marie Johnson would have met the substantive require-
ments of the safety valve because Congress made a huge misstep 
with its ‘first step’ when it failed to make section 402 retroac-
tive.233 This error would have denied Alice Marie Johnson free-
dom.234  
 
B. The Second Step—The Four Rs 
 
So, what must be Congress’ second step? Legislative reform 
must encapsulate the “Four Rs” of sentencing reform: (1) Repeal, 
(2) Retroact, (3) Review, and (4) Revise.235  
 
(1) Repeal mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug of-
fenders who are not serious drug felons in conjunction with 
the expanded safety valve criteria in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 
(f).236 
 
Since the passage of the SRA, mandatory minimums have facil-
itated easier convictions for first-time, low-level, and nonviolent 
drug offenders because mandatory minimums curtailed judicial 
discretion and emboldened prosecutors to charge crimes that re-
sulted in unjust sentences.237 The primary issue with mandatory 
minimum sentences is that no two drug crimes are identical, but 
 
231 See U.S. Sentencing Commission, supra note 224, at 1. 
232 See supra notes 223-25. Alice Marie Johnson would not have qualified for prerelease 
custody because she was serving a life sentence. 
233 See supra note 223.  
234 See supra notes 223, 225-26. 
235 This is a term coined by the author. 
236 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (f) (2020); supra note 223. See also U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, First Step Act, (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/newslet-
ters/2019-special_FIRST-STEP-Act.pdf.  A serious drug offense is one that is prohibited 
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) for which the defendant served a term of imprisonment of 
more than 12 months and was released from any term of imprisonment within 15 years of 
the instant offense. 
237 See supra Parts I and II. See also WEAPONIZING JUSTICE: MANDATORY 
MINIMUMS, THE TRIAL PENALTY, AND THE PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT, 31 FED. 
SENT. R. 309, 310, 2019 WL 2453398. 
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mandatory minimums ignore this fact and institutes a one-size-
fits-all sentencing scheme where standardized weight-based pen-
alties are valued more than individualized sentencing.238 This ar-
gument is not devoid of historical context.  In 1970 Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act and repealed most drug-related federal mandatory minimum 
sentences.239 That 1970 Congress recognized the rigidity of man-
datory minimum sentences and strived to establish “a more real-
istic, more flexible, and thus more effective system of punishment 
and deterrence of violations of the Federal narcotic and dangerous 
drug laws.”240 The House of Representatives stated, “severe pen-
alties, which do not take into account individual circumstances, 
and which treat casual violators as severely as they treat hardened 
criminals, tend to make conviction . . . more difficult to obtain.”241 
Repealing mandatory minimum sentences for first-time, low-
level, and nonviolent drug offenders makes sense. In 2017, “[o]nly 
19.4% of federal drug cases involved a weapon. Almost two-thirds 
of persons convicted of offenses involving powder cocaine (63.8%) 
and marijuana (63.3%) had the lowest criminal history possible 
. . . .”242 In addition, there exists an inverse correlative relation-
ship between age and the recidivism rate.243 Mandatory mini-
mums provide diminishing returns for first-time, low-level and 
nonviolent drug offenders because “people generally age out of 
crime. The 18-year-old who is given a long sentence for robbing a 
pharmacy is much less likely to engage in crime when he is 40.”244 
 
238 See Molly M. Gill, Let’s Abolish Mandatory Minimums the Punishment Must Fit the 
Crime, HUM. RTS., SPRING 2009, at 4, 5. The circumstances and drug offenders’ criminal 
background, state of mind, and level of involvement varies from case to case.; see also Kevin 
Ring in USA Today: “I once wrote mandatory minimum laws. After ties to Abramoff landed 
me in prison, I know they must end.,” FAMM (Oct. 17, 2018), https://famm.org/kevin-ring-
in-usa-today-i-once-wrote-mandatory-minimum-laws-after-ties-to-abramoff-landed-me-in-
prison-i-know-they-must-end/.  
239 See Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two 
Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 66 (2009). 
240 Jelani Jefferson Exum, From Warfare to Welfare: Reconceptualizing Drug Sentenc-
ing During the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 941, 943 (2019).  
241 Tonry supra, note 240, at 71. 
242 Stephen F. Smith, Federalization’s Folly, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 49 (2019).  
243 See generally Haile, supra note 75, at 644. 
244 See id. 
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It follows that, mandatory minimums are actually only suited for 
high-rate or extremely dangerous drug offenders.245 
There is overwhelming support for the repeal of mandatory min-
imum sentences on every hand.246 FAMM likens repealing man-
datory minimum sentences to turning off the spigot of an overflow-
ing bathtub and recommends that this should be the first step in 
criminal justice reform.247 Federal judges purport that mandatory 
minimums impose grave costs on the offender and the criminal 
justice system.248 One federal judge in Iowa stated, “in most of the 
over 1,000 congressionally-mandated mandatory minimum sen-
tences that I have imposed over the past twenty-two years, I have 
stated on the record that they were unjust and too harsh.”249 Sev-
enty-seven percent of the American public agreed that mandatory 
minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders should be elim-
inated so that the judiciary can resume its traditional role of dis-
pensing fair and just sentences commensurate to the crime.250 
Further, Congress would not be alone in its repeal of mandatory 
minimum sentences.  States have recognized the detrimental ef-
fects of mass incarceration on “prisoners, their families, and soci-
ety” and have been proactive in tackling sentencing and prison re-
form.251 Thus, state models can inform the federal solution for 
mandatory minimum sentences.252  
 
245 See Michael Tonry, Equality and Human Dignity: The Missing Ingredients in Amer-
ican Sentencing, 45 CRIME & JUST. 459, 474 (2016). 
246 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
247 See Molly M. Gill, The Paul-Leahy “Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013” S. 619: Pre-
venting Lives and Money From Being Lost Down the Drain, 26 FED. SENT. R. 94, 97 (2013) 
[hereinafter Paul-Leahy].  
248 See Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal Justice Reform, 
74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 277, 288-89 (2019).  
249 Id. at 289. 
250 See Christopher Ingraham, Here’s how much Americans hate mandatory minimum 
sentences, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/01/heres-how-much-americans-hate-mandatory-mini-
mum-sentences/.  
251 Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1579, 
1596 (2019).  
252 See Dartunorro Clark, Massachusetts Has a Blueprint for What’s Next in Criminal 
Justice Reform, NBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-
news/massachusetts-has-blueprint-what-s-next-criminal-justice-reform-n1105911  (ex-
plaining that Massachusetts eliminated some mandatory minimum sentences for low-level 
drug offenders); see also Senate Approves Criminal Justice Reforms, OKLA. ST. SENATE 
(Apr.  17, 2018), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases/press_re-
leases_2018/pr20180417a.htm (explaining that Oklahoma eliminated life without parole 
for drug possession with intent to distribute, distribution, manufacturing and trafficking 
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(2) Retroactive application for the expanded safety valve and the 
repeal of mandatory minimum sentences 
 
Retroactivity is key in order to promote fairness in sentencing 
reform.253 It is inequitable that “two individuals who commit the 
exact same offense should . . . receive different punishments 
merely because they are sentenced on different dates.”254 An ap-
proach that allows only prospective reforms weighs the date of sen-
tencing more heavily than the conduct and characteristics of the 
defendant.255  
The Brennan Center for Justice commended Congress for its sig-
nificant first step after the passage of the First Step Act but rec-
ognized that the bill represented a compromise of a compromise 
because most of the sentencing reform changes were not given ret-
roactive effect when compared to legislation proposed during the 
Obama Administration.256 Specifically, the Sentencing Reform 
and Corrections Act of 2017 expanded the federal safety valve for 
low-level drug offenders (like the First Step Act) and made the 
change retroactive.257 The Commission estimated that the retro-
active provisions of the Act would cause 12,000 federal prisoners 
to be eligible for sentence reductions.258 
When Congress created the drug offense safety valve in 1994 it 
intended to address the concern that “many first-time, low-level, 
and nonviolent drug offenders were receiving mandatory mini-
mums that did not fit them or their crimes.”259 Today, the safety 
 
and many other mandatory minimum sentences).; see also FAMM Praises Maryland Lead-
ers for Eliminating Mandatory Minimums for Low-Level Drug Offenders, FAMM (Apr. 12, 
2016), https://famm.org/famm-praises-maryland-leaders-for-eliminating-mandatory-mini-
mums-for-low-level-drug-offenders/ (explaining that Maryland passed the Justice Reinvest-
ment Act in 2016 which repealed mandatory minimum sentences for low-level drug offend-
ers, expanded the existing safety valve, and made the changes retroactive so that low-level 
offenders can petition for revised and reduced sentences).  
253 See Haile, supra note 75, at 640-42. 
254 Id. at 640. 
255 See id. 
256 See Raghavan, supra note 224. 
257 See S. 1917: Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017 (115th Congress), 
FAMM (Apr. 27, 2018), https://famm.org/s-1917-sentencing-reform-corrections-act-2017-
115th-congress.  
258 See Haile, supra note 75, at 641. This is likely the sum total for all of the retroactive 
provisions of the Act. 
259 See Paul-Leahy, supra note 248 at 94. 
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valve is an important feature of federal sentencing because it al-
lows this category of federal drug offenders to escape prison sen-
tences that do not match their crimes and level of culpability.260 
But, when Congress failed to make section 402 retroactive in the 
First Step Act, it maintained the status quo for defendants like 
Alice Marie Johnson and left thousands in federal prison.261 So, it 
is necessary to make a sentencing reform bill retroactive to expe-
dite “the reduction of the federal prison population, and [correct] 
. . . unwarranted disparities.”262 
The retroactive application of the repeal of mandatory minimum 
sentences for first-time, low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders 
would have a tremendous impact on the federal prison population 
while also incurring a negligible impact on public safety.263 A de-
crease in the prison population does not necessarily result in an 
increase in the crime rate.264 The Federal Bureau of Prisons re-
ported that, as of December 26, 2019, there were 175,858 inmates 
housed in federal prison.265 Of the total federal inmates, 58.3% 
and 16.6% were serving original sentences from five to twenty 
years, and twenty years to life imprisonment respectively.266 Of 
the total federal inmates, 73,784 (or 45.3%) were serving time for 
drug offenses.267 Therefore, “any efforts to reduce federal incarcer-
ation should start with drug offenses.”268  
 
(3) Judicial Review of drug offender petitions, and (4) Revise 
sentences on account of the retroactive expanded safety 
valve and repealed mandatory minimum sentences and in 
 
260 See id. at 94, 97. 
261 See supra note 176. 
262 Haile, supra note 75, at 640. 
263 See Column: 5 charts show why mandatory minimum sentences don’t work, PBS 
(June 1, 2017, 11:45 A.M.), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/5-charts-show-manda-
tory-minimum-sentences-dont-work. 
264 See Leipold, supra note 252, at 1595-96. 
265 See Statistics, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/popula-
tion_statistics.jsp (last updated Dec. 26, 2019).  
266 See Sentences Imposed, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statis-
tics/statistics_inmate_sentences.jsp (last updated Dec. 21, 2019). 
267 See Offenses, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statis-
tics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Dec. 28, 2019). The percentage of federal inmates 
for other categories ranged from 0.2% to 19%. Id.  
268 Ryan King et al., How to reduce the federal prison population, URBAN INST., (Oct. 
2015) http://apps.urban.org/features/reducing-federal-mass-incarceration/.  
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accordance with 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582  (c)(1)(B) and 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (a)269 
 
The retroactive application of the FSA marks a shift of the bal-
ance of power from prosecutors to the judiciary where judges can 
exercise discretion and grant sentence reductions considering 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (a) criteria.270 It will be the same effect with 
this proposed solution to ‘repeal’ and ‘retroact.’  
The Commission’s most recent amendment to the Guidelines for 
drug offenses indicate courts can handle “resentencing with rela-
tive ease” when it does not need to engage in “backward-looking 
factual determinations or . . . complicated legal analysis.”271 
Amendment 782, also known as “Drugs Minus Two” went into ef-
fect in November 2014 and the change was made retroactive.272 
The role of the judiciary in the execution of Amendment 782 illus-
trated that judges are neither ineffective nor inefficient in admin-
istering sentence reductions based on retroactive sentencing re-
form.273 Federal judges granted over 30,000 sentence reductions 
with an average sentence reduction of 25 months.274 Similarly, the 
proposed second step retroactive solutions can be implemented by 
foregoing prosecutorial, evidentiary, and other investigative in-
quiry, and embracing the Guidelines ranges to resentence first-
time, low-level, and nonviolent drug offenders.275 Simply, the ju-
diciary can “recalibrate the offender’s sentence within a new sen-







269 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3553; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (c)(1)(B).  
270 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3553.  
271 Nathaniel W. Reisinger, Redrawing The Line: Retroactive Sentence Reductions, 
Mass Incarceration, and the Battle Between Justice and Finality, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
299,  304 (2019); see also 2014 Drug Amendment, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, 
https://www.ussc.gov/topic/2014-drug-amendment. 
272 Reisinger, supra note 272, at 304. 
273 See id. 
274 See id.  
275 See id. at 312. 
276 See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Though the Framers provided broad discretion to the President 
to exercise the clemency power, one cannot imagine the Framers 
intended clemency to replace the role of the legislature to correct 
inequities in the criminal justice system.277 Rather, the clemency 
tool should be used in extenuating and individualized circum-
stances when the law fails to effectuate justice.  The evidence re-
veals a legislative solution that institutes retroactive sentencing 
reform is a more viable solution than clemency to solve America’s 
mass incarceration problem.  Certainly, this is true reform—and 
clemency alone could not achieve the desired results.  While Con-
gress took a solid first step towards legislative reform with the 
First Step Act, strong second steps must come next. The four Rs—
Repeal, Retroact, Review, and Revise—should be the core of the 
next legislative reform. 
 
 
277 See James Pfiffner, Pardon Power, HERITAGE, https://www.heritage.org/constitu-
tion/#!/articles/2/essays/89/pardon-power.  
